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Abstract 
If publicly observable characteristics such as age, sex, household size, and education help predict 
borrowing from informal groups, they may also help predict creditworthiness in generaL Because 
formal lenders can collect and consider this information cheaply, its use may help to screen poor 
credit risks. Econometric results suggest that age and household size may indeed indicate 
creditworthiness among the rural poor in Africa. 
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I. Introduction 
A. Beyond Descriptive Analysis of Informal Finance 
People in Sub-Saharan Africa without access to formal financial institutions depend on 
informal groups for financial services. A huge literature describes the incarnations of these 
arrangements across the continent (Adams and Fitchett). Although descriptive studies are 
always fascinating, in many cases they praise the virtues of informal arrangements without 
indicating how formal arrangements can imitate them. Research should go beyond simply 
extolling the virtues of informal arrangements to explore feasible techniques to transplant those 
virtues to the formal sector. 
B. The Value of Cheap Information 
Informal group lenders, with cheap access to information concerning a borrower's 
character (willingness to repay) and financial condition (ability to repay), are generally 
acknowledged to be excellent judges of creditworthiness. Formal institutions which lend to the 
poor, on the other hand, have a dismal record of picking good credit risks. Assuming that 
investigating a potential borrower's character would be prohibitively costly, formal lenders 
base decisions on evaluations of financial condition as signalled by either collateral or the 
analysis of business plans and accounting records. The poor, who cannot signal financial 
strength in these ways, usually end up with few, if any, formal loans. 
Some information about potential borrowers, namely publicly observable character-
istics, can be obtained as cheaply by formal lenders as by informal group lenders. For 
example, a loan officer can easily note an applicant's sex, age, education, and household size 
during a short visit to a residence, and misrepresentation is not easy. 
If group lenders are good judges of creditworthiness, they will not often lend to bad 
credit risks. If publicly observable characteristics help predict who borrows from informal 
groups, then they may also help predict creditworthiness. This cheap information may have 
substantial value in helping formal intermediaries screen applicants. 
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C. Objective of the Study 
This study analyzes informal financial arrangements by groups in peri-urban Banjul, 
The Gambia. The goal of its statistical procedures is to inform disussions concerning the 
feasibility of incorporating the operational virtues of the informal groups in formal institutions. 
The analysis centers on borrowers associated with two types of group lenders, Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations (osusus in Mandinka), and a type of local community 
organization in The Gambia (kafos). Speculation centers on a single question: Do publicly 
observable characteristics help predict creditworthiness? 
The paper proceeds in three sections. Section I contains the study's background. 
Section II analyzes a binomial logit regression of borrowing on some publicly observable 
characteristics. Section III concludes the analysis. 
H. Background of the Study 
A. Group Lenders in the Sample 
1. Osusus (Rotating Savings and Credit Associations) 
Osusus in The Gambia are groups of 10 to 30 members who meet regularly to 
contribute a fixed amount of cash to a pot which is immediately distributed by some rule of 
rotation to a single member. The meetings and the contributions continue until all members get 
one pot. Thus, osusus collect cash and immediately disburse all of it. In any given tum, the 
pot has two components: a refund of the payments contributed by the pot's recipient in 
previous meetings, and a loan equal to the amount scheduled to be contributed by the recipient 
in future meetings. 
2. Kajos (Community Organizations) 
Kafos in The Gambia are groups of about 100 members who provide each other with 
basic social, financial, and insurance services. Most kajos maintain a common fund by 
occasionally collecting dues and by selling produce from a plot farmed collectively by its 
members. Kajos draw on the common fund for grants to members who suffer a shock such as 
an illness in the family, and for loans. Many kajos also collect small deposits at regular 
intervals and periodically return the accumulated sum, often immediately before Ramadan. 
Thus both kafos and osusus collect deposits, but the amount lent by kafos need not equal the 
amount collected at a given meeting, nor must every kafo member borrow. 1 
1 Kafos and osusus in The Gambia are documented by Nagarajan and others (1994), and by 
Shipton (1992, 1993). In order to focus on loans from groups, borrowers using individual lenders 
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B. The Sources of the Data 
This study uses cross-sectional data collected in two random surveys during February 
to May 1993 in peri-urban Banjul, The Gambia. The flrst survey concentrated on land-market 
issues and was conducted by the Land Tenure Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
The second survey focused on horticultural markets and was conducted by the International 
Finance Group at the Ohio State University. Both studies included questions about transactions 
in financial markets. 2 The LTC survey provided 666 of the 716 observations in the data set. 
The data set was restricted to observations with answers recorded for age, sex, 
household size, and education. This restriction resulted partly from a desire to analyze only 
publicly observable characteristics and partly from the need to use only those variables that 
were compatible between the two surveys. The sample includes 126 borrowers and 590 non-
borrowers. Of the 126 borrowers, 71 used osusus, and 55 used kafos. 
III. An Econometric Model of the Borrowing Decision 
A. The Variables 
The dependent variable Borrow equals unity if the informant borrows, and zero 
otherwise. This study assumes a logistic probability model where the likelihood that an agent 
will borrow depends on household size, sex, age, and education. 
The integer variable Number In Family represents the number of people eating from a 
common pot. The dummy variable Female equals one if the informant was a woman and zero 
otherwise. The dummy variables Young, Middle-aged and Older indicate the informant's 
age, whether 18 to 25, 26 to 35, or over 35 years. Education is represented by three dummy 
variables--Dliterate, Koranic,3 and Literate. 
were dropped from the data set. 
2 Roth (1993) details the methodology of the LTC survey. Nagarajan and others (1994) 
provide more information about the OSU survey and additional implications for Gambian fmancial 
markets. 
3 A koranic education indicates basic numeracy and the ability to recite some verses of the 
Koran. 
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B. The Hypothesis 
The fundamental hypothesis is that groups screen potential borrowers according to "the 
degree of stability or permanence of the individual in the community. Individuals who are 
likely to move to other areas are systematically eliminated from participation." (Cope and 
Kurtz, 1980, p. 228-229). This preference arises among informal lenders because mobile 
borrowers can escape the sanctions for default more easily than those who cannot move. 
Women, for example, often have children to care for and thus may find skipping town more 
difficult than men would, holding other factors constant. Likewise, the rewards for staying 
home may be higher for members of large households. 
Under this hypothesis, creditworthiness and thus borrowing should increase with age 
because older people relocate less often than the young. Older people also have had a chance 
to establish reputations. Finally, more education means more mobility and thus less 
creditworthiness. 
Table I shows estimated directions and relative magnitudes for the effects of these 
variables on the probability of borrowing from an informal group. A description and 
interpretation of the significant results follows. 4 
1. Larger households borrow more than smaller households 
This result, common in econometric analyses of informal borrowing,5 probably reflects 
three factors: 
• Moving has a high opportunity cost for members of large households because 
they abandon a larger support network; 
• Large households, ceteris paribus, invest more in productive opportunities and 
consume more than do smaller households, increasing the likelihood that they 
would at some time desire to borrow; 
• Large households have more stable cash flows because they have more 
interlinkages with the community and more (and more diversified) sources of 
4 Loans result from the simultaneous interaction of supply and demand, but the data reveal 
only their intersection. The interpretations offered here recognize that a complete model would 
explicitly include both supply and demand. For example, the fact that a given agent did not 
borrow could be due to supply, demand, or both. Given the ubiquity of group lenders in The 
Gambia, however, it seems likely that most creditworthy borrowers could find willing group 
lenders if the potential borrower could not get loans elsewhere or did not want to get loans 
elsewhere. 
5 See Besley and Levenson (1993), and Cuevas and Schrieder (1991). 
5 
income from adults members. In addition, children in rural areas contribute to 
household income through such activities as wood collection, and water 
transportation, and livestock care. 
2. Women borrow more than men 
This result can be interpreted from at least four angles: 
• Women, because of child-rearing responsibilities and for other reasons, are less 
mobile; 
The poor resort to informal loans only after exhausting better sources of 
financing. If women are poorer than men and thus have less access to formal 
and other sources of finance than men do, they will probably resort to informal 
finance more often;6 
Women, whether because of cultural or religious custom, responsibilities to 
children, or reduced literacy, hold fewer of the salaried jobs whose predictable 
income streams both reduce the desire to borrow and increase the ability to get 
loans from formal sources; 
• In many subsectors in The Gambia, women dominate petty trade, an occupation 
where small, frequent loans are useful for financing inventories and working 
capital. Traders also desire to make small, frequent deposits as they sell 
inventory. Informal arrangements, especially osusus, are well-tailored to this 
pattern of cash flow. 
3 . Literacy decreases borrowing 
A Koranic education increases informal borrowing, but such an education does not 
imply literacy. Simple illiteracy also increases informal borrowing, although the estimated 
coefficient is different from zero only at the 13 percent level. This result can be seen from two 
angles: 
• Literacy is often required for salaried government jobs whose smooth income 
streams simultaneously reduce the desire to borrow and increase the ability to 
borrow; 
• Young men are the largest group of literates in The Gambia, and neither the 
young nor the male borrow informally as much as the older and the female do. 
6 For example, agricultural cooperatives make fertilizer loans primarily to men. The men 
often relend or sell the fertilizer to their wives or others (Shipton, 1993). 
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4. The middle-aged borrow more than the young 
Three factors may make middle-aged borrowers more attractive credit risks than 
younger borrowers: 
• Older people are less likely to move than are younger people; 
• An older potential borrower may have already established a reputation over a 
lifetime of interactions; 
Older people may have better informal guarantees, be they physical collateral or 
cosigners. 
5. What can cheap information reveal about creditworthiness? 
The highly significant Chi-square statistic in Table I suggests that publicly observable 
characteristics may indeed help a formal lender predict a potential borrower's 
creditworthiness. This is correct, up to a point. It does make sense for formal lenders to 
capitalize on the insight that informal lenders judge older people and people with larger 
families to be better credit risks than otherwise. It does not make sense, however, to conclude 
that education reduces creditworthiness, nor that women are better credit risks than men. It is 
more likely that males and educated people borrow from informal groups less because their 
better creditworthiness increases their access to more-preferred sources of finance. Although 
all of the publicly observable characteristics analyzed here help predict borrowing from 
informal groups, not all of them help predict creditworthiness. 
The regression results do indicate that group lenders do consider some illiterate women 
to be creditworthy. This does not mean that formal lenders should begin giving preference to 
illiterate women, but it does imply that even the poorest of the poor desire financial services 
and can fulfill their obligations under adequate incentive structures. 
6. Estimated effects on the probability of borrowing 
Graph I illustrates the effects on the probability of borrowing caused by changes in 
household size and age, holding education constant at illiterate. The bottom solid curve traces 
the probability of borrowing for a young female as household size increases, while the top 
dashed curve represents the corresponding probability for a middle-aged female. Holding 
everything else constant, the effect of changing from young to middle-aged is the vertical 
difference between the two curves.7 The effect of changing the household size, ceteris paribus, 
7 The absolute magnitudes of the independent variables on the probability of borrowing is not 
directly apparent from Table II because the probability of borrowing is a non-linear function of 
all the independent variables and all the estimated coefficients (Greene, 1993, p. 639). Let X be 
a vector of variables including: a constant; an integer variable number in family; two dummies 
7 
is the vertical distance between the two points on a given curve that correspond to the different 
household sizes. The effect of age and household size on the probability being judged 
creditworthy by group lenders seems large enough to merit attention from formal lenders. 
IV. Summary: Some Publicly Observable Characteristics Help Predict 
Creditworthiness 
Formal lenders may be able to profit from the fact that older people and people in 
larger households are more likely to be creditworthy than are younger people or people in 
smaller households. This result is inferred because informal groups are good judges of credit-
worthiness and people with these characteristics borrow more from informal groups than 
others do. 
The feasibility of incorporating these publicly observable characteristics in the process 
of screening potential borrowers depends on the decreased costs of less delinquency and 
default and the increased costs of collecting, calculating, and considering the extra 
information. The net benefit could very well be positive because obtaining and handling this 
simple information should be cheap. 
Knowledge of characteristics cannot completely substitute for knowledge of character. 
Women and non-literates are significantly more likely to borrow informally than are men and 
literate people, but this probably does not mean that illiterate females are especially good 
credit risks. Rather, it probably means that men and literate people either borrow from other 
sources or do not desire to borrow as much. 
for sex, male and female; three age dummies young, middle-aged and elderly; and three 
education dummies literate, illiterate, and koranic. For example, X=[l 8 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0] 
corresponds to an informant in an 8-person household who is female, young, and illiterate. Let 
p be a vector of estimated coefficients from logistic regression, in this case, [-4.367, 0.045, 
0.000, 1.539, 0.000, 0.907, 0.394, 0.000, 0.705, 0.900]. Under the logistic probability model, 
the likelihood of borrowing is exp(X'P)*[l +exp(X'j3)]-1• Since exp(X'j3)=exp[1 *(-
4.367)+8*0.045+ 1 *1.539+ 1 *0.705]=0.172, the probability of borrowing in this example is 
0.172/1.172 = 0.146. The effect of moving from young to middle-aged is calculated by changing 
the fourth and fifth elements of X to give [1 8 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0]. Repeating the calculation gives 
0.425/1.425 =0.298. Thus, for an illiterate female in an 8-person household, moving from youth 
to middle age changes the probability of borrowing by 0.298-0.146=0.152. This difference has 
been marked on Graph I. 
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Table I. Estimated Coefficients For Binomial Logistic Regression of the Borrowing 
Decision on Publicly Observable Characteristics. 
Independent variable Borrower is 1 if informant borrowed, 0 otherwise. 
Variable Estimated Coefficient 
Constant 
Household Size 
Female 
Middle-aged 
Older 
Illiterate 
Koranic 
Model Chi-square 
Log-likelihood 
a*** Significant at 1 percent. 
**Significant at 5 percent. 
* Significant at 10 percent. 
-4.367 
0.045 
1.539 
0.907 
0.394 
0.705 
0.900 
86.789 
-289.72 
Sample includes 126 borrowers and 590 non-borrowers. 
Standard Error 
0.492 
0.015 
0.254 
0.289 
0.277 
0.471 
0.436 
Significance 
*** 
*** 
*** 
** 
** 
*** 
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